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1" ... either the world is sane (heil), then art is not really necessary;
or the world is insane (unheil), then art is really too weak: it is
superfluous or unable to change anything."
(Odo Marquard)
Lothar BredelIa
lWO CONCEPTS OF ART:
ART AS AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION OF REALITY
AND AS INTERACTION WITU TUE RECIPIENT
Is it possible to overcome the dilemma expressed in the epigraph by Odo Marquard? In order to fmd an
answer to this question I would like to compare two different concepts of art. The frrst one, art as affirmation
and negation as developed by Herbert Marcuse and Theodor W. Adorno explores the ambivalent nature of
art in an insane world. Art which does not fulfill the critical function of changing or negating reality is
accused of being "affrrmative" because it serves to maintain this insane world. I shall attempt to explore the
possibilities and limits of tbis concept of art.
The second approach foregrounds the relationship between the art work and the recipient's values,
experiences and attitudes towards reality. Here, I will concentrate on lan Muka10vskY's aesthetics. But before
I analyse bis concept of art I will refer to Hans Robert lauB and Stanley Fish. lauB stresses the communi-·
cative and rhetorical function of art and thus highlights what Adorno's aesthetics rejects. Stanley Fish severely
criticizes the concept of interaction. For him the meaning of a literary work lies neither in the work itself nor
is it created in the interaction with the recipient but instead is imposed on the work by the reading
community. While for Adorno the recipient has "to vanish in the aesthetic experience," for Fish the aesthetic
experience is' a complete appropriation of the art work by the reading community. The critique of Fish's
position is the presupposition for the concept of art as interaction.
1. Herbert Marcuse: The Innocence of Culture • Lost and Regained
In bis influential essay "The Affrrmative Character of Culture" (1937) Marcuse stresses that art, as
part of the realm of freedom, fulfills an inhumane function in society as a whole. It serves to maintain and
even justify the unjust and repressive realm of necessity in which most people are exploited.
Marcuse argues that Greek philosophy up to Plato intended to shape social reality in accordance
with reasonable insight. The idea that the world should be regulated by philosophical knowledge is also
expressed in the opening phrase of Adorno's Negative Dialektik: "Philosophy which appeared to be out-dated
stays alive, because the moment of its realization has been missed." 1 Although Marcuse recognizes that
Plato's ideas in The Republic are problematic, he praises Plato for his intention to organize the world on the
basis of philosopbical insight and criticizes Aristotle for having betrayed this intention. According to Marcuse,
1 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), p.13.
(Quotations from publications in German were translated into English by Sharon Wotschke)
2Aristotle - facing the inhumanity of the world - confmes philosophy to the realm of culture, in which only
a few are able to strive· for the good, the beautiful, and the true. Philosophy no longer feels responsible for
the reasonable organization of the world as a whole, but concentrates on the realm of culture. Thus culture
becomes a luxury of a few based on the exploitation of many?
Although Marcuse regards Aristotle as a bourgeois philosopher, he does not make him a
representative of affIrmative culture. The Greek bourgeois philosophers openly admit that the world of truth,
goodness and beauty exists only for a few. But this good conscience of the Greek philosophers disappears
in modern bourgeois culture. Now those things that were conceived for only a few are to be available to
everyone. Thus culture becomes affrrmative:
Aristotle did not assert that the good, the beautiful, and the true are universally valid and
obligatory values which should also permeate and transfigure "from above" the realm of
necessity, of the material provision for life. Qnly when this claim is raised are we in the
presence of the concept of culture that became central to bourgeois practice and its corres-
ponding weltanschauung?
Culture becomes affirmative when it demands of the exploited that they disregard their miserable material
existence and turn to the true, the beautiful, and the good. Affrrmative culture teaches that material
happiness is not really important, and that the only important thing which deserves our attention is the
beauty of the soul:
Culture means not so much a better world as a nobler one: a world to be brought about
not through the overthrow of the material order of life but through events in the individual's
soul~
Affirmative culture is, as described by Marcuse, inhuman and cynical.
To the need of the isolated individual it responds with general humanity, to bodily misery
with the beauty of the soul, to external bondage withinternal freedom, to brutal egoism with
the duty of the realm of virtue.5
Marcuse, stressing the repressive reactionary character of culture, develops a reductive approach to culture.
We must not look at the individual work of art but consider its functionin reality, and this function is
affrrmation of an unjust and oppressive social order, irrespective of the meaning of the individual work.
Marcuse, however, counteracts this reductive approach when he points out that art can transcend its reaction-
ary function and gain a progressive one. Art not only affrrms but can also change the world in which most
people suffer.
The realm of the soul can be a form of protest against misery and the dominant bourgeois virtues
of efficiency. In it, ideals are embodied that - as Marcuse stresses - are worth being realized. On the one
2 Cf. Herbert Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," in Negations. Essays in Critical17zeory. Co-
translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p.88.
3 Marcuse, "The Affrrmative Character," p.91.
4 Marcuse, "The AffIrmative Character," p.l03.
5 Marcuse, "The AffIrmative Character," p. 98.
3hand, art is used to make people ignore their material misery. But. on the other hand, art can become the
model for a better world so that people will no longer tolerate injustice and suffering and change the realm
of necessity. The idea of a better life, as embodied in art, can turn into an explosive revolutionary force.
Affrrmative culture, says Marcuse,
certainly [...] exonerated "external conditions" from responsibility for the "vocation of man,"
thus stabilizing their injustice. But it also held up to them as a task the image of a better
order.6
But how can we explain that art has sometimes an affrrmative and sometimes a negating effect? And is it
not idealistic to assume that the world of necessity can be affrrmed or negated by the realm of art?
The dialectic of affirmation and negation Marcuse develops is based, as Peter Bürger emphasizes,
on the model of Marx's critique of religion. According to Marx, religion is the expression of a false
consciousness, yet it contains an element of truth in distorted form. Happiness, which man desires to [md
on earth, is postponed by religion until after death. In this respect religion is false consolation, which
prevents people from changing their miserable conditions. But it is also an expression of man's need for
happiness and a "protest against real misery" (Marx). Therefore, the critique of religion must not simply
abolish religion, but insist on redeeming its moment of truth. It must see to it that the happiness religion
promises in heaven is realized on earth.7 If this model of critique is applied to art, then art must end in the
same way as religion. Art is false consciousness and has a compensatory function as long as it is enjoyed as
art. Therefore, art as art must be abolished. As religion will cease to exist as "superfluous" when the
happiness promised in heaven is realized on earth, art will end when its utopian content is realized and the
division between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom is overcome.
Yet, when revolutionary groups in the 1960s demanded that art as art should be abolished, Marcuse
did not take their side even though the demand was put forward with arguments that might have been taken
out of the essay on affirmative culture.B At first it seems that Marcuse is only fending off"a false abolition"
of art which means that art might cease to exist without the realization of its human content in the world of
necessity although the tone of his defense already indicates that the affrrmative function of art is receding
into the background:
The "end of art" is conceivable only if men are no longer capable of distinguishing between
true and false, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, present and future. This would be the state
of perfect barbarism at the height of civilization - and such astate is indeed a historical
possibility;
Art is astate of true consciousness and its disappearance would make the realm of necessity absolute. Art
no longer has a transitory significance but is permanent. This new concept of art is already indicated by the
6 Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character," p. 120.
7 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), p.1l.
B Herbert Marcuse, COllnte"evolution and Revolt (London: The Penguin Press, 1972), p.9l.
9 Marcuse, COUnle"evollllioll, p.12l.
4title of bis next book on aesthetics: Die Pennanenz der Kunst. Wider eine bestimmte marxistische Ästhetik.10
Here, Marcuse argues that art is permanent, because even in a socialist society in its "most democratic form"
people will still suffer from conflicts between the individual and society and from the fear of death and will
still be entangled in guilt.11 Does this new concept of art imply that art takes on a compensatory function -
a function wbich Marcuse so severely criticized in "The AffIrmative Character of Culture"? Marcuse
develops bis new concept of art by criticizing what he calls orthodox Marxist aesthetics.
Marcuse attacks orthodox Marxist determinism in order to save the dialectic between the realm of
freedom and the realm of necessity or, in Marxist terms, the dialectic between superstructure and basis. As
he points out, for orthodox Marxists bourgeois art is determined by the basis and thus cannot help but affIrm
the interests of the ruling class. In tbis concept there is no room for the dialectic between the affIrmative and
the negating critical function of art. Marcuse vehemently attacks such determinism wbich would have made
it impossible for Marx and Engels to transcend their class interests. But if we admit, Marcuse stresses, that
the "classics of socialism .... could break through class limitations" then the same "should also be valid for
great artists." 12
Marcuse also attacks the orthodox Marxists for identifying justice and humanity with the ideas of
one class, the proletariat. Even if we were to disregard the fact, he argues, that the proletariat of today does
not have a revolutionary consciousness in a world of manipulation, its "consciousness would not be the
privileged or the sole force which could preserve and reshape the truth of art." 13 The orthodox Marxist
position, Marcuse argues, too readily ridicules concepts such as individuality, subjectivity, and soul as an
expression C?f class interests. Such a critique of ideology is not so much a sign of liberation from affIrmative
culture, .but rather a sign of barbarity:
Today, the rejection of the individual as a 'bourgeois' concept recalls and presages fascist
undertakings. Solidarity and community do not mean absorption of the individual. They
rather originate in autonomous individual decision; they unite freely associated individuals,
not masses.14
What is valid for the bourgeois individual is also valid for bourgeois literary figures: They cannot be reduced
to class interests:. "The inexorable entanglement of joy and sorrow, celebration and despair, Eros and
Thanatos cannot be dissolved into problems of class struggle." 15
For Marxist aesthetics, great art has to mirror reality objectively but for Marcuse art creates another
world wbich questions "the monopoly of established reality" 16 :
10 The English translation was published under the title The Aesthetic Dimension. Towards a Critique 01
Marxist Aesthetics.
11 Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension. Towards a Critique 01MarxistAesthetics. Translated and revised
by H. Marcuse and Erica Sherover (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), pp.71 ff.
12 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, pp.18-19.
13 Marcuse, Tlte Aestltetic Dimension, p.31.
14 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, pp.38-39.
15 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension,p.16.
16 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dinzension, p.9.
5The aesthetic form changes reality in a way that breaks the pressure of normali~and the
weight of the established. Men and things appear in a different light: their OWD.
When Marxist thinkers criticize bourgeois literature because it does not describe characters realistically, for
Marcuse their "unrealistic behavior" does not have a reactionary but rather a revolutionary function:
Mimesis is representation through estrangement, subversion of consciousness. Experience
is intensified to the breaking point; the world appears as it does for Lear, Anthony,
Berenice, Michael Kohlhaas, Woyzeck, as it does for lovers of all times. They experience
the world demystified.18
According to Marcuse, we as readers, experience the necessity of revolution when we identify with the
rebellious characters of bourgeois literature. Therefore works of art do not need to bring up the subject of
revolution: "It seems that in these works the necessity of revolution is presupposed, as the apriori of art." 19
The works of art, however, which want to support revolutions and give up their autonomous character are
in danger of betraying the revolutionary cause.
In the new concept of art the affirmative function of art has completely disappeared. In "The
Affrrmative Character of Culture" Marcuse argued that art takes on an affrrmative function because it
presents the recipient with a utopian world in order to make him forget the inhumanity and injustice in reali-
ty. In The Aesthetic Dimension, however, Marcuse stresses that great works of art do not overlook the
injustice and suffering in the realm of necessity. Works of art no longer deceive the recipient by showing him
a sane world. On the contrary, they confront him with injustice and suffering. This even applies to a work
of art with a happyend. "It [the work as a whole] preserves the remembrance of things past. They [sorrow
and unfreedom] may be superseded (aufgehoben) in the resolution of the tragic conflict, in the fulfillment
attained. But though superseded, they remain present ..." 20 Marcuse now emphasizes that Goethe's
Iphigenie highlights that humanity is only an ideal in the world of necessity:
Moreover, we have known for a long time that pure humanity does notredeem all human afflictions
and crimes; rather it becomes their victim. Thus it remains ideal ... 21
However, for Marcuse art is still under the suspicion of being subject to "infamous afftrmation" on account
of its form and beauty. But he rejects this suspicion by arguing that the "reconciled" always recalls the
"unreconciled.',22 And he justifies the autonomy of art by insisting that it is an expression of sensuality which
the "petty bourgeois" pursues with hatred and condemns as "infamous sensuality." 23 In The Aesthetic
Dimension art na langer needs the critic of ideology or a critical theory to separate the affrrmative from the
17 Herbert Marcuse, Die Pennanenz der Kunst. Wider eine bestimmte Inarxisitsche Ästhetik (MÜnchen, Wien:
Carl Hanser, 1977), p.18.
18 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, p.45.
19 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, pp.13-14.
20 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dinlension, p.48.
21 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dilnension, p.58.
22 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dilnension, pp.59f.
23 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dbnension, p.67.
6critical function of arte Art is apriori revolutionary, but it has given up the claim of being able to overcome
the division between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom.
Let us return to the dialectic of affIrmation and negation. Marcuse is certainly right in criticizing
orthodox Marxist aesthetics because it makes a dialectic between superstructure and basis impossible. But
is his own concept dialectical? While for orthodox Marxists the basis determines the superstructure, for
Marcuse the superstructure determines the basis, because the realm of necessity as a pIace of mere
exploitation and inhumanity is unable to bring about change so that redemption must come from the outside,
the world od fredom or the superstructure.
The dialectic based on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom does not give room to what
onemight call the realm of praxis in which people interact with others and in which they decide about their
way of life and their actions. Thus the realm of necessity ignores the cultural element inherent in every social
order. This devaluation of the social world corresponds to an overestimation of the realm of philosophy and
art, which is supposed to redeem the world from the outside.
When Marcuse praised Plato for bis intention of organizing the world in accordance with
philosophical insights, he could have realized that it is not enough to put philosophy into practice in order
to create a humane and just reality. One could easily quote more examples which all give evidence to the
insight that reasonable "praxis" is more than putting ideas into practice. Marxism itself seems to be the victim
of such a concept. Therefore we need another concept of the realm of necessity as well as another concept
of art. But before we turn to such concepts we have to explore the most impressive attempt to understand
art from the concept 'of the dialectic of negation and affrrmation.
2. Adorno: Art as Reconciliation and Its Failure
In contrast to Marcuse, Adorno right from the beginning rejects the idea of art as ideology. In "Lyric
Poetry and Society" he says:
The greatness of works of art lies solely in their power to let those things be heard which
ideology conceals. Whether intended or not, their success transcends false consciousness.24
While for Marcuse in "The Affrrmative Character of Culture" art fulfills an affIrmative function by making
people forget the misery of reality, Adorno stresses that art cannot help but reveal the misery and suffering
in the realm of necessity. Even if Stifter claims that it is possible to portray the right way of life, through his
transfiguring portrayal "shines the hidden, repressed suffering of the alienated subject and thus the
unreconciled nature of real life." 25 For Adorno, art cannot be affIrmative and reactionary. The critical
concept of society is inherent in it:
All works of art, including the affIrmative ones, are ipso facto polemical. The very notion
of a conservative work of art is somehow absurd. By emphatically severing all ties with the
empirical world, art in an unconscious way expresses its desire to change that world?6
24 Theodor W. Adorno, "Lyric Poetry and Society," in Telos, XX (1974), p.58.
25 Theodor W. Adorno, Aestltetic Theory (London, Boston: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1984), p.331.
26 Adorno, Aestltetic Theory, p.253.
7So, even art which tries to exclude unreconciled reality points to it because that which has been excluded as
unacceptable from art is indirectly present. The distance of the lyric poem from society is "a protest against
a social condition which every individual experiences as hostile, distant, cold, and oppressive .. ." 27 Thus the
radical absence of the social world in a poem indicates the alienation of the lyric "I" from society: "Its
detachment from naked existence becomes the measure of the world's falsity and meanness. Protesting
against these conditions, the poem proclaims the dream of a world in which things would be different." 28
It is this dialectic between absence and presence which characterizes Adorno's method of interpretation.
The world of suffering is always painfully present in the attempts to exclude it.
If art negates the world as it is, what is the world it presents like? According to Marcuse in The
Aesthetic Dimension, art presents us with the rebellious individual. For Adorno, however, art does not take
sides with the subject against society but attempts the reconciliation between subject and object.
Language is the medium for this transformation. It enables subjectivity to turn into objectivity?9
Reconciliation is possible if the poet does not use language in order to express himself, but rather gives
himself up to it, so that his language "comes to full accord with the language itself, Le. with what language
seeks by its own inner tendency.',30 The instrumental use of rationallanguage mutilates things by subsuming
them under concepts. Therefore, true art must undo this injustice by the poet devoting himself completely
to language.
With these formulations, Adorno comes close to Heidegger's concept of language. He seems to be
aware of this proximity when he emphasizes, that, on the other hand, one must not make language an
absolute voice of existence, as is the case in "some current ontological theories of language":
The moment of self-forgetting in which the subject submerges in language is not a sacrifice
of himself to Being. It is not a moment of compulsion or forcej not even of force againstthe speaking subject, but rather a moment of reconciliation, ... 1
In a world that would be different from ours the subject would give up its "stubborn self-assertion" and would
no longer be an agent of suppression.
How critical Adorno is of OUf use of everyday language and what he expects from art can be
highlighted in comparison to the structuralists' concept of language and art. Structuralists would agree with
Adorno that language imposes its order on nature. However, Adorno and the structuralists diametrically
differ in evaluating this situation. While the structuralists take a certain pride and perhaps even delight in
demonstrating that language imposes its order on the world and consigns meaning to it, for Adorno this
imposition of order and meaning is a sign of barbarity and the continuation of the mythical cycle of
domination and suppression. In .this respect Adorno could argue that structuralism is an expression of the
violent attitude inherent in Western culture which does not tolerate the particular, the non-identical and the
27 Adorno, Lyric Poetry, ·p.58.
28 Ibid.
29 Adorno, Lyric Poetry, p.62.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
8heterogeneous. While structuralism excludes as irrelevant what escapes language, Adorno expects art to
atone for the violence and injustice inflicted on an amorph nature by language.
The structuralists, however, dissolve the distinction between instrumentallanguage and art. Since
all forms of language confer meaning on the world, literary texts have lost their privileged status. If literary
texts have a distinguished status, it is because they do not disguise that they are nothing but language. They
openly admit their fictionality and do not pretend to be more than a system of signs. For Adorno, however,
art has to give expression to the particular and the heterogeneous which evades our concepts. Weshall
encounter a special form of structuralism wheri we discuss Stanley Fish's concept of art.
Adorno and the structuralists, however, agree in their demotion of the recipient although for
different reasons. For the structuralist, the system determines the rules by which people speak and write and
understand. Heidegger fmds unanimous approval among structuralists when he says: "Language speaks.
Man speaks only in so far as he historically'complies with' language.',32 For the structuralist, the distinction
between "langue" and "parole" seems to be no longer an analytical one, but an absolute one. The system
absorbs the individual who is nothing but an intersection of various roles defmed by the system. Jonathan
Culler quotes Levi-Strauss: "The goal of the human sciences is not to constitute man, but to dissolve him." 33
According to the structuralist method things have to be taken apart in order to isolate their parts and to
determine the rules by which they are composed. This is the scientific attitude which Adorno and
Horkheimer seem to have in mind when they say that "enlightenment behaves towards things as a dictator
towards man. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them.',34 The structuralists want to abolish the
human subject because he is nothing but "a series ofconventions, the grids ofregularity and intersubjectivity."35
Adorno wants to abolish him because he is the agent of suppression who does not acknowledge what is
different.
In order to understand Adorno's critique of the subject and his concept of art we must view it in the
framework of the dialectic of enlightenment. The aim of enlightenment is, as Horkheimer and Adorno
emphasize, to free man from the fear of nature. Man should no longer be subject to its overwhelming power.
But this aspired liberation failed and instead brought about· new domination and submission. Reason itself
which had aimed to free man from the power of nature becomes a brutal force, subsuming nature as weIl
as man:
In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at
liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth
radiates disaster triumphant.36
By proclaiming man as the ruler of the earth, enlightenment leads to total domination over nature which is
degraded to mere material for man's manipulating power. In this context it is the task of art to atone for the
32 Quoted in Jonathan CuIler, Strncturalist Poetics. Strncturalisl11, Linguistics alld the Study 0/ Literature
(London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1975), p.29.
33 Quoted in Culler, Strncturalist Poetics, p.28.
34 Max Horkheimer & Th.W. Adorno, Dialektik der Alljklänuzg (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1969), p.9.
35 Culler, Strocturalist Poetics, p.258.
36 Horkheimer, Adorno, Dialektik der Alljkärnng, p.3.
9injustice inflicted on nature by reason and to break out of the mythical cycle of domination and submission.
Adorno takes up the romantic concept of art which says: "Art must become nature again." For him, this
dictum contains a moment of truth as weil as of non-truth:
Truth, because it demands of art that it speak out for the oppressed of all kinds of
domination including the rational kind; non-truth because such language cannot be imagined
in contrast to rational language which is mediated through the totality of culture.37
These words already indicate why the desired reconciliation between reason and nature will fmally fail. Art
itself contains an insolvable contradiction: It speaks out against reason and civilization, which mutilate nature,
but it can only speak for the oppressed through rationallanguage. Art wants to become a natural object, but
cannot escape being constructed. Thus we face a dilemma:
... every act of making in art is an endless endeavor.to articulate what the makeable would
not be and what it does not know, that is the spirit of art. This is where art has its place as
a restorer of historically repressed nature.J8
Enlightenment has entangled thought in a vicious circle, with disastrous consequences. It began by freeing
man from his fear of nature, but now it is destroying nature. According to Horkheimer and Adomo, the
disaster of our world is a product of unrestrained thought based on enlightenment which forces the
unconditional surrender of nature to its categories:
Enlightenment behaves towards things as a dictator towards man. He knows them in so far
as he can manipulate thenl. The man of science knows things in so far as he can make
them. In this way their potentiality is turned to bis own ends. In the metamor~hosis the
nature of things, as a substratum of domination, is revealed as always the same. 9
According to Adorno civilization has not yet been achieved because our civilization is still based on the
mythical cycle of domination and submission and thus has been unable to overcome barbarity:
Civilization, historically leading out beyond barbarity, has also promoted it to this day
through repression which exercises its principle of dominating nature:W
In our enlightened world in which the cycle of domination and submission has not been broken, art points
to a world in which things would be different. But on the other hand there is the danger of art turning into
a "fetish." Art, therefore, can only remain true if it attempts to articulate a world in which things would be
different and at the same time expresses the failure of this attempt. In a world dominated by false
consciousness, art itself cannot escape ideology; therefore, according to Adorno, philosophy is necessary to
examine the inherent contradictions in art. Qnly this self-reflection prevents art from becoming ideology.
37 Theodor W. Adorno, "Zum Klassizismus von Goethes Iphigenie" in Adorno, Notizen zur Literatur IV
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), p.10.
38 Theodor W. Adorno,Ä"sthetische Theorie. Gesamnzelte Schriften Band 7 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970),
p.198.
39 Max Horkheimer & T.W. Adorno, Dia/ectic 0/En/ightenment (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), p.9.
40 Adorno, "Zum Klassizismus von Goethes Iphigenie," p.23.
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Yet, art can only articulate and thus liberate the non-identica1 and the heterogeneous by creating
a whole. Form is the promise of such a whole', the unity of a manifold. But this unity is not without
repression. Form selects and cuts off so that things fit into the whole. Thus Adorno comes to the conclusion:
We can see here how repression is carried from reality into art works. They would rather
shake it off, but they cannot. Form is this amoral essence. The more they emphasize form,
the greater is the injustice they perpetrate.41
It is the inherent intention of art to escape the general and do justice to the particular, but it is doomed to
failure: ttThe unity of art works cannot be what it must be, i.e. unity of a manifold. By synthesizing the many,
unity inflicts damage on them, hence also on itself.,,42 Art wants to escape the domination which governs the
world but is itself a form of domination. Dialectical thinking tends to dissolve contradictions in a higher unity.
Adorno, however, puts the emphasis on the particular and heterogenous. For him the integration of the
particular into the whole is a violent act. He stresses that the reconciliation is always gained at the expense
of the particular. This allows him to criticize those who proclaim that contradictions have been overcome in
art as well as in reality.
Yet, even if a genuine reconciliation could be achieved, it would not be truth, but ideology, because
it could only be brought about by distancing art from the realm of necessity and thus leaving this realm as
it is. Art can only be art by "foreswearing intervention in reality." Therefore "art becomes culpable precisely
because it refuses to intervene." 43 While for Marcuse in "The Affirmative Character of Culture" in analogy
to Marx's critique of religion art can fmally overcome the division between the realm of necessity and the
realm of freedom, Adorno makes clear that this intention is doomed to failure. The dialectic of affrrmation
and negation starts from the assumption that art should not only interpret the world but change it, yet fmally
it has to admit that art is inherently affirmative and ideological. "In fact, it is art's truth itself - reconciliation
of the kind that reallife denies - which is the accomplice of ideology, since it pretends that reconciliation is
a fact." 44 Thus art fmally falls prey to "infamous affrrmation":
At present, all works of art including radical ones have a conservative tinge, for they help
reinforce the existence of aseparate domain of spirit and culture whose practical impotence
and complicity with the principle of unmitigated disaster are painfully evident.45
All works of art are laden with guilt, including the radical ones, because they are unable to abolish the
division between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom but rather deepen it:
Art is an exodus from the world which never succeeds in leaving the world behind.
Conversely, the world remains untouched by art since the latter merely reflects the former.46
41 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.208.
42 Adorno, Aesthetic 171eory, p.212.
43 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.194.
44 .Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.195.
45 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.333.
46 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.481.
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For Adorno, art is the only protest against tbe world as it is and a sign of a world in which things would be
different, but the reconciliation it promises fails. This is the "truth of art" which Adorno's aesthetic theory
reveals.
Käte Hamburger accused Adorno of constantly speaking about the truth of art without being able
to say what he means by "truth." 47 She calls the sentence "True is what does not fit into this world" Adorno's
"credo" and fmds the same idea in the following statement: "In the rise of the Non-Being, as if it existed, the
question of art's truth takes its impulses." If the truth of art lies in what is not, then Käthe Hamburger also
comprehends Adorno's criticism of Plato whose "ontology was annoyed by art's illusionary character." But
she cannot comprehend Adorno when he, at the same time, accuses art of lying. Thus she comes to the
conclusion that the question as to the truth of art "obtains no answer." 48
But what Hamburger rejects as meaningless makes sense within the context we have reconstructed.
For Adorno, truth is indeed what does not fit into the world: the reconciliation between the particular and
the general, between the subject and the object, and between nature and reason. But art cannot fulfill the
"objective" promise to break up the mythical cycle of domination and submission. Therefore Adorno can
accuse art of lying. In contrast to Käthe Hamburger's view, one could argue that the problem of Adorno's
aesthetic theory is not that the concept of "truth" remains "empty", but rather. that the truth of art is too
narrowly defmed in the dialectic of enlightenment.
Adorno's concept of art is part of a comprehensive philosophy of history in which art gains its
significance. How the concept of history determines the concept of art is also underscored in Adorno's severe
criticism of Lukacs's aesthetics in "Erpreßte Versöhnung. Zu Georg Lukacs Wider den mißverstandenen
Realismus." (Forced Reconciliation: On Georg Lukacs's Against Misunderstood Rea/isnl) The way both
authors evaluate modern literature is closely connected with their interpretation of the historical
development.
For Lukacs who believes in the historical development as predicted by Marx, art fufills its mission
if it portrays reality realistically. Therefore he accuses modern literature - which is mainly represented·by the
works of Kafka, Proust, Joyce and Beckett - ofbeing "ontologieal" and "solipsistic." The fIrst reproach implies
that modern .literature portrays man as an essentially lonely being, and the second one means that modern
literature denies the existence of an objective reality. Lukacs concludes that an ontological and solipsistic
description of reality prevents people from understanding the true sources of the their plight in modern
society and thus prevents them from taking the necessary political action. Therefore modern art fulftlls an
affIrmative, reactionary function.
Adorno agrees with Lukacs' phenomenologica1 description of modern literature. It presents us with
an ontological and solipsistic world, buthe accuses Lukacs of not being able to think historically. When we
encounter loneliness and isolation Adorno expects us to interpret it historically, no matter how it is presented
in art: "But precisely Lukacs, who claims to think radically historically, would have to admit that this
47 Käte Hamburger, Wahrheit und Ästhetische Wahrheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), p.89.
48 Hamburger, Wahrheit, p.83.
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loneliness [...] is mediated socially and has major historical content." 49 But Lukacs could raise the objection
that Adorno's argument misses the point. It is no question of how he, Lukacs, and Adorno interpret
loneliness, but how modern literature interprets it.
Another objection Adorno raised against Lukacs's position is more to the point. Adorno accuses
Lukacs of being blind to the difference between philosophy and art. Adorno agrees with Lukacs that ontology
and solipsism are affIrmative and reactionary in philosophy but stresses that they are progressive and polemic
in art:
Beckett, who most often seems to eliminate all concretely bistorical content and merely
tolerates primitive situations and behaviour, uses the non-historie facade as the provocative
rebuttle of what is idolized by reactionary philosophy. [...] Concepts such as Beckett's are
objectively polemic:o
For Adorno, solipsism in art is objectively polemic because it expresses our longing to overcome the division
between subject and object, but it does not present it as a "fact": "... the work of art criticizes reality through
the power of the contradiction between the object as reconciled in the picture by the subject spontaneously
absorbing the object, and the actually unreconciled exterior." 51 Adorno demonstrates the same dialectic in
his interpretation of the inner monologue. For Lukacs it symbolizes the worldlessness of modern art, wbich
prevents us from understanding the world we live in. For Adorno it expresses our desire for reconciliation
as weIl as the failure of this reconciliation because in an atomistic society "man is ruled by estrangement and
because he -as one must accredit Lukacs with - becomes a shadow through this." 52 For Adorno art which
mirrors ~eality is no longer an expression of true but rather of false consciousness because it conveys the
illusion that an historical development is still possible. True art, however, must go beyond reality as a place
of disaster, but at the same it must not deny this reality. Otherwise, it would make us forget reality and
become affIrmative. Only art which negates reality and demonstrates the failure of this negation can be an
expression of true consciousness. In such a concept of art there is no room for the recipient. Art as negation
and affIrmation is an aesthetics without a recipient. Adorno severely criticizes the recipient who uses the
work of art to satisfy bis needs and stresses that the recipient has to subordinate himself to the art work:
The subjective experience of an opposition to the ego is a moment of art's objective truth.
To thosewho obsessively relate art works only to themselves, the avenue of lived experience
is closed... 53
Adorno would have been a severe critic of a subjective criticism as developed by David Bleich 54 and Fish,
as we will see below. He would have interpreted it as an expression of our violent culture which is unable
49 Theodor W. Adorno, "Erpreßte Versöhnung. Zu Georg Lukacs 'Wider den mißverstandenen Realismus',"
in Noten zur Literatur 11 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1961), p.162.
50 Adorno, "Erpreßte Versöhnung," p.166.
51 Adorno, "Erpreßte Versöhnung," p.164.
52 Adorno, "Erpreßte Versöhnung," p.165.
53 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.348.
54 David Bleich, Readings and Feelings. An Introduction to Subjective Criticism (Urbana/Illinois: TCTE, 1975).
David Bleich, Subjective Criticisnl (BaItimore: University Press, 1978).
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to acknowledge what is different and what cannot be controlled. Yet Adorno not only criticizes the recipient
who imposes his concepts on the work of art and uses it to satisfy bis needs, but pleads for the negation of
the recipient so that the work of art can develop its inherent objective dialectic:
Pre-artistic experience is based on projection. By contrast, real aesthetic experience is a
movement against the subject for the sake of the subject and its apriori primacy. Real
aesthetic experience requires self-abnegation on the part of the viewer, the ability to respond
consciously to what art works say and what they keep to themselves.55
Adorno stresses that it is not the task of art to please the recipient: "The bourgeois wants his art luxurious,
his life ascetic. It would make more sense if it were the other way around." 56 Yet, Adorno is aware of the
consequence of such a radical rejection of the enjoyment of art: "Let us acknowledge a limitation of this
critique [of enjoyment of art], though: if the last trace of enjoyment were expunged from art, we would face
the embarrassing question of what works of art are for." 57 Although Adorno admits that the question of
what works of art are for cannot be answered without reference to the recipient, it is obvious that his
aesthetic theory has no place for him because his philosophy of history decides how works of art are to be
understood.
The rejection of the recipient is not surprising if we consider that he is part of the insane world and
that he is an agent of domination. Art should therefore overcome the recipient as weIl as the world:
What is called "communication" today is the adaptation of spirit to useful aims and, worse,
to commodity fetishism. Similarly, the equally popular term "meaning" is also enmeshed in
these sorry developments.58
If it is the function of art to negate reality, it is logical that the art work should also negate the recipient who
should "vanish in the work of art. tt 59 Adorno finds only one emotion appropriate to the aesthetic experience,
tremor (Erschütterung), because it makes the recipient disappear:
A legitimate subjective response to art is a sense of concern (Betroffenheit). Concern is triggered
by great works. Concern is not some repressed emotion in the recipient that is brought to the
surface by art but a momentary discomfiture, more precisely a tremor (Erschütterung), during which
he gives himself over to the work~o
Against the background of contemporary response theory wbich subordinates the literary work to the
recipient's strategies and needs, Adorno's emphasis on the art work is a useful correction. Adorno is right
when he stresses that the aesthetic experience is not identical with projection, but it will not come about
without projection. The recipient's cooperation is needed to produce "the aesthetic object" as we shall see
when we discuss Mukafovskyts aesthetics.
55 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.474.
56 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.19.
57 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp.lSf.
58 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.109.
59 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.19.
60 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.346.
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One could argue that Adorno c.ontradicts his own aesthetic theory when he interprets individual
works of art. His interpretations reveal how they are determined by his concept of history. But such an
attempt to integrate bis aesthetic theory into MukafovskY's would have to ignore that Adorno explicitly
denies that the meaning of the art work is created in the interaction with the recipient and that he demands
that the self as part of the insane world should be overcome in the aesthetic experience.
When Adorno stresses that "tremor" (Erschütterung) is the only legitimate subjective response
because it makes the recipient give himself up to the art work, he refers to Kant's concept of the sublime
and re-evaluates it. In Critique 0/Judgement "tremor" in connection with the experience of the sublime makes
us conscious of our indestructable inner seIfe In the face of the overwhelming force of nature we experience
how insignificant we are as physical'beings, but this experience initiates a counter movement wbich makes
us aware of the sovereignty of our' inner seIf as spiritual beings~1 Thus the experience of the sublime
deepens the division between our physical andour spiritual nature. For Adorno, however, tremor should not
make us aware of our indestructable spiritual seIf, on the contrary it should efface the sovereignty of the seIf:
The utopia anticipated by ar~istic form is the idea that things at last ought to come into their
OWD. Another way of putting this is to call for the abolition of the speIl of selfhood bitherto
promoted by the subject~2
While for Kant we experience the sublime in the face of overwhelming nature which makes us aware of our
spiritual seIf, for Adorno we experience it when we overcome the speIl of selfhood and give ourselves over
to the work of art.
Recently Wolfgang Welsch has attempted to interpret Adorno's aesthetic theory as an aesthetics of
the sublime, as the title of bis essay indicates: "Adorno's Aesthetics: An Implicit Aesthetics of the Sublime."
He argues that Adomo had to give up the concept of reconciliation because reconciliation presupposes
form and form means selection which will suppress and mutilate what does not fit. Welsch is right when he
stresses Adorno's critical explorations of form. Yet, he is mistaken, I think, when he assumes that Adorno
replaced the concept of reconciliation by the concept of the heterogeneous. Welsch does not do justice to
Adomo's aesthetic theory when he divides the aesthetic theory into a fIrst phase, concentrating on reconcilia-
tion, and a second one, concentrating on the heterogeneous~3 Adorno is aware of the fact that Hegers
dialectic demonstrates the triumph of the spirit which appropriates the non-identical. The negative dialectic
attempts to put a stop to this appropriating movement in which the non-identical disappears in the whole.
Thus he takes sides with the particular, but this gesture would become ideological if it were not to
demonstrate its failure. The promise of reconciliation and its failure are basic elements of Adorno's
aesthetics and cannot be separated.
Iris Murdoch also re-interpreted Kant's concept of the sublime which at fIrst sight is similar to
Adorno's re-interpretation. In "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited" she says:
61 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1963), p.154.
62 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.195.
63 Wolfgang Welsch, "Adornos Ästhetik: eine implizite Ästhetik des Erhabenen," Das Erhabene zwischen
Grenzerjahrong und Größenwahnsinn, ed. Ch. Preis (Weinheim: VC, 1989), pp.185-213.
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Kant's man stands alone in confronting mountains or the sea and feels defiant pride in the
free power of his reason ... whereas the man that I haye in mind facing the manifold of
humanity, may feel, as weIl as terror, delight, but not if he really sees what is before him,
superiority. He will suffer that undramatic, because un-self-centered, agnosticism which
goes with tolerance~4
For Iris Murdoch the experience of the sublime is closely connected with the experience of contingency. We
dislike contingency because it questions our power to control things. In her fust novel Under the Net the
protagonist, Jake Donaghue, hates contingency and constructs a world in which everything is necessary, but
fmally he has to realize: "I feIt ashamed ... of having conceived things as I pleased and not as they were." 65
It is our inherent tendency to distort reality because we want to control it. The consequence is "totalitarian
man" who does not tolerate anything beyond himself.66 It is the task of art to liberate us from this need to
appropriate what is different: "It is important, too, that great art teaches us how real things can be looked
at and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the
seIf." 67
To a certain extent Murdoch's and Adorno's aesthetics are similar, but finally they differ radically,
because for Adorno art has to overcome reality as a place of disaster while for Murdoch art has to make the
recipient accept reality. She attacks the New Critics who demand from the work of art that it should liberate
us from the messy contingent reality:
What is feared is history, real beings and real change, whatever is contingent, me"ssy,
boundless, infinitely particular and endlessly to be explained; what is desired is the timeless,
non-discoursive whole which has its significance completely contained in itself~8
I have already indicated that Adorno's aesthetic theory subordinates art to philosophy, because the
recipient as part of the insane world is unable to understand the true significance of art. The aesthetic
experience must be replaced by philosophy:
Truth content is not what art works denote, but the criterion which decides if they are true
or false in themselves. It is this variant of truth content in art and this variant alone which
is susceptible of philosophical interpretation because it corresponds to an adequate concept
of philosophica1 truth. The present state of mind, fIXated as it is on immediacy and tangible
concerns, is unable to establish this kind of link with art, the only link that opens a window
upon the truth content of art. Aesthetic experience must pass over into philosophy or else
it will not be genuine~9
64 Iris Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," in The Yale Review (49,1960), pp.268-269.
65 Iris Murdoch, Under the Net, (London: Penguin, 1964), p.247.
66 Lothar Bredella, "Wirklichkeitserfahrung und Erzählstruktur in den Romanen von Iris Murdoch," in
Miscellanea Anglo-Anlericana: Festschrift für Helnlut Viebrock, eds. K. Schuhmann, W. Hortmann, A.P.
Frank (München: Karl PressIer, 1974), pp.6-7.
67 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignity 0/ Good (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1970), p.65.
68 Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," p.260.
69 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.l90.
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This seems to imply that philosphy and art coincide and that art illustrates the insights of philosophy. Adorno
rejects this reductive consequence by pointing out that philosophy alone cannot determine what is true and
false in a work of art. The philosophical analysis has to be complemented by a formal one: "what one has
to do is to understand its inner crystallization." 70 The formal analysis Adorno recommends resembles that
of the New Critics. But the question arises of how the formal analysis and the philosophical interpretation
can be related to each other. If both of them confrrm each other, then there seems to be a pre-established
harmony. Adorno himself is aware of this possibility, but assumes that it can be avoided: "Speculative thought
is easily duped into thinking there is a pre-established harmony between society and works of art, courtesy
of world spirit. Their true relation is different, however." 71 But it is hard to demonstrate that the formal
analysis does not presuppose the result of the philosophical interpretation and vice versa.
Rüdiger Bubner points out in bis critique of Adorno's aesthetic theory that we have to put the
aesthetic experience - the interaction between the work of art and the recipient - at the center of our interest
if we want to do justice to art.72 Hans-Robert JauB tries to do precisely this in his book Ästhetische
Erjahnuzg und literarische Henneneutik (Aesthetic Eyperience and Literary Henneneutics), although he defmes
the aesthetic experience differently than Bubner does. He directs our attention to what Adorno's dialectics
of Affrrmation and Negation rejected:
3. Hans Robert Jauß: The Co~municativeAchievement of the Aesthetic Experience
According to JauB, we cannot understand the significance of literature if we assurne that literary
works either affrrm or negate the social norms and orientations. Such an approach ignores that literary ~orks
articulate norms and attempt to change the recipient's consciousness. For JauB, art creates "an objectively
binding meaning." 73 Thus, art works not only oppose society but also have an effect on it by trying to
influence the norms that guide man's actions in society. JauB uses a number of examples from Western
history to illustrate how art plays an important role in developing, justifying, and changing social norms. One
of his·examples is Minnesang. JauB admits that the praise of the aristocratic mistress can be interpreted as
an affrrmative transfiguration of the noble class, but such an interpretation would overlook that a new love
ethic was articulated:4 Minnesang negates the church's norms of marriage. Insofar we have a negation of
norms, though this negation does not condemn the world as a place of disaster, but rather tries to change
our understanding of love and marriage from within the world. Art does not negate the world but trans-
forms our concepts of reality.
How can art succeed in making the recipient adopt new norms? JauB takes up the Aristotelean
concept of catharsis. Adorno had strongly criticized catharsis because it fulfills an affrrmative compensatory
function. He accused it of serving "the function of providing aesthetic-illusory substitute gratification in place
70 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.479.
71 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.335.
72 Cf. Rüdiger Bubner, Ästhetische Erfahrung (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), p.58.
73 Hans R. Jauß, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hemteneutics. Translated by Michael Shaw (Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p.17.
74 JauB, Aesthetic Experience, p.18.
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of real bodily gratification of instincts and needs." 75 Adorno as well as Marcuse in his earlier period are
very suspicious of the possibility that art might make life bearable and thus affirm the insane world. To JauB,
however, Adorno's rejection of catharsis is just another sign of the prejudice in modern theories of art which
exclusively concentrate on the work of art itself and ignore the role of the recipient. A consequence of such
a concept of art is that the effect becomes detached from the work itself and is left to psychologists who
measure the effect without considering the form and content of the work of art. Therefore, we need a
concept of art which regards the effect of art, not as an alien element but as an essential part in the
interaction between the work of art and the recipient.
While for Adorno identification with the hero means that the recipient subsumes the work of art
under his needs, for Jauß it is more adequate to say that this identification means that the recipient steps
out of his pragmatic context and takes the role of another. In order to feel pity and fear, the recipient must
take interest in the hero's fate. Thus, according to JauB, the Aristotelean catharsis achieves what Adorno
believed could be attributed only to autonomous art, namely that it breaks the "spell of obdurate self-
preservation." 76 This is, of course, too rash a conclusion because Adorno is not interested in a recipient who
extends his scope of experience through art. Such an interpretation of the aesthetic experience would not
negate the world but involve us in it. It would not overcome the self but strengthen it. Before we continue
with the analysis of JauB's concept of the aesthetic experience let me refer to Arthur Danto who pursues the
process of identification one step further. He interprets an art work as a metaphor and comes to the
conclusion:
... the greatest .metaphors of art I believe to be those in which the spectator identifies
himseU with the attributes of the represented character and sees his or her life in terms of
the life depicted: it is oneself as Anna Karenina, or Isabelle Archer, or Elizabeth Bennett,
or 0: oneself sipping limetea; in the Marabar Caves, in· the waters off East Egg; in the
Red Chamber ... where the art work becomes a metaphor for life and life is transfigured.77
If the work of art is a metaphor which allows us to see our world transfigured, then we can learn something
about ourselves. But we can only do this if we know that we are not completely identical with the character
we identify. Identifying with Anna Karenina, one does not forget
that one is not a Fine Woman or necessarily a woman at all, let alone a Russian and a
nineteenth-century person. You cannot altogether separate from your identity your bellefs
about what that identity is: to believe yourself to be Anna is to be Anna for the time you
believe it, to see your life as a sexual trap and yourself as a victim of duty and passion:8
Danto relates the art work to the world of the recipient in such a way that it allows the recipient to step out
of his own world to take the role of the other and extend his scope of experience:
75 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.338.
76 JauB, Aesthetic Experience, p.95.
77 Arthur D. Danto, 771e Transfiguration 0/ the Conunonplace. A Philosophy 0/Art (Cambridge/Mass. and
London: Harvard University Press, 1981), p.172.
78 Danto, Transfiguration, p.173.
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Art, if a metaphor at times on life, entails that the not unfamiliar experience of being taken
out of oneself by art- the familiar artistic illusion - is virtually the enactment of a
metaphoric transformation with oneself as subject: you are what the work of art ultimately
· b I fi d· · 79IS a out, a commonp ace person trans Igure Into an amazmg woman.
This concept of art as metaphor allows Danto to reconsider the severely criticized concept of the art work
as a mirror and to point to the cognitive properties of mirrors which the critics of this concept might have
overlooked:
... since there are things we may see in them we cannot see without them, namely ourselves.
And fIXing upon this asymmetry of mirror images, Hamlet made a far deeper use of the
metaphor: mirrors and then, by generalization, art works, rather than giving us back what
we alread~ can know without benefit of thenl1 serve instead as instruments of self-
revelation. 0
We, as recipients, do not vanish in the art work but these help us to understand the world and ourselves. But
now let us return to Jauß and his interpretation of the Aristotelean catharsis. It is controversial as to how
the Aristotelean concept of catharsis should be interpreted.
G.B. Hardison points out that the phrase "catharsis of incidents arousing pity and fear" 81 has been
translated in three different ways. In one translation "catharsis" means "purgation." This would imply that
Aristotle accepts Plato's premise "that emotions ('passions') are threats to the intellect" but that he, Aristotle,
would set him at ease by assuring him, Plato, that art arouses emotions such as fear and pity not in order
to be overwhelmed by them but on the contrary, in order to get rid of them~2 If we, however, translate
"catharsis" with "purification," then emotions are no longer something which we have to get rid of but
something we have to accept as part of ourselves~3 Yet, Hardison argues, both interpretations ignore the
cognitive element. Emotions are not mechanically aroused hut depend on what we perceive and how we
perceive it. Therefore Hardison translatescatharsis with "clarification" and relates this meaning to Aristotle's
concept of art as imitation. Hardison interprets imitation in the same way as Danto interprets the mirror
image. Imitations do not merely give us back what we already know but rather serve as instruments of
learning and self-revelation. Therefore even imitations of painful experiences produce pleasure in us.
According to this interpretation, "catharsis" is closely connected with understanding and self-revelation~4
Jauß's interpretation ignores this cognitive element and stresses that the aroused emotions are a means to
put the spectator in such astate of mind that he is willing to accept new attitudes and norms.
79 Ibid.
80 Danto, Transfiguration, p.9.
81 G.B. Hardison Jr., "A Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics," in A Transfiguration ofAristotle's Poetics. A
Translation and Commentary for Students of Literature, ed. Leon Golden (Englewood Cliffs/New Jersey,
1968), p.134.
82 Cf. Hardison, "A Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics," p.135.
83 Ibid.
84 Lothar Bredella, "Literary Texts and Intercultural Understanding: Arthur Miller's Play Death of a
Salesman," in Understanding the USA: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Peter Funke (Tübingen: Gunter
Narr, 1989), pp.201-202.
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In order to develop this dimension of the aesthetic experience further, Jauß takes up ideas of the
Sophist Gorgias. As JauB points out, Gorgias is aware of the effects that tremor (phobos) and misery (eleos)
can evoke in the listener. In contrast to Aristotle, Gorgias is not only interested in arousing the recipient's
feelings, but in what is made possible through this process. While modern aesthetic theories, which regard
a work of art as a self-contained whole, have ignored or suppressed the rhetoric function of art, Jauß stresses
that for centuries art has been evaluated by the effects it was supposed to bring about. But he also adds that
often it was accused of not being able to bring about the intended effects because of the ambivalent nature
of the aesthetic experience. In order to understand this ambivalence JauB refers to St. Augustine.
In Confessions St. Augustine differentiates between the use of the senses for lust (voluptas) and for
inquisitiveness (curiositas). The former directs our attention to positive perceptions and the latter to negative
ones, such as the fascination of a mangled corpse. For JauB, however; another distinction becomes even more
important in order to explain the ambivalent nature of the aesthetic experience: the distinction between the
good use of sensual pleasures, which directs them towards God, and the bad, which directs them towards the
world~5 In the first case, the world is presented as God's creation, and thus our belief in God is
strengthened. In the second case, we enjoy the work of art for its own sake. Thus the rhetorical or practical
function is replaced by the delight in the things themselves. St. Augustine reproaches himself for forgetting
God while shedding tears on account of Aeneas's and Dido's tragic fate~6 In a similar way Rousseau attacks
the aesthetic experience. The spectator feels pity with the unlucky characters but does not help them. Art
makes us enjoy things for themselves and thus negates the rhetorical or practical function of art:
The spectator is not moved to aid the sufferer but merely to be sorry for him; and the more
the author of these fictions makes the audience grieve, the better they like him~7
Strangely enough we fmd the same reproach in "The AffIrmative Character of Culture." We enjoy, Marcuse
argues, the justice and humanity embodied in art and forget to change the world. Even Adorno accuses art
of becoming "culpable precisely because it refuses to intervene."
I think that JauB's rediscovery of the rhetorical function of art leaves us with a basic problem. He
subordinates the aesthetic function to the rhetorical one so that it becomes impossible to distinguish between
an art work and a religious or political treatise. Thus the work of art becomes a means for making readers
accept certain values. This reduction becomes clear when Jauß describes Brecht's intention in the following
words:
The problem was not just how the theater could again become both entertaining and
instructive, how [disfamiliarization] could bring pleasure, but also how the solitary spectator
could be motivated to pass from critical reflection to solidary action, and this means how
norms of action could be suggested to him without their being overtly or covertly imposed~8
85 Hans R. Jauß,Ästhetische Erfahrnngund literarische Henneneutik(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), p.74.
86 -Cf. JauB, Asthetische Erfahrnng, p.175f.
87 Quoted in JauB, Aesthetic Experience, p.104.
88 JauB, Aesthetic Experience, p.i0?
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Jauß's reduction of art to rhetorical or practical functions makes a closer analysis of the aesthetic experience
necessary. Having started with Jauß, we should now turn to Wolfgang Iser, the second main representative
of the Konstanz school. In his book The Act 0/ Reading Iser gives a detailed description of the interaction
between the literary text and the recipient. However, I have dealt with Iser's aesthetics in another paper 89
and MukaYovskys considerations of the aesthetic experience as an interaction between the art work and the
recipient are of special significance in the context of this paper. But the concept of interaction has recently
been severely criticized by Stanley Fish. Therefore it seems necessary to deal with his criticism, in order to
fmd out whether or not we have to give up the concept of interaction.
4. Stanley Fish's Criticism of the Concept of Interaction
In his essay "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser" Stanley Fish accuses the concept of interaction
of wanting to have it both ways:
He [Iser] criticizes theories 'which give the impression that texts automatically imprint
thernselves on the reader's mind' but his theory cannot get off the ground unless it claims
exactly that for the set of directions that guide the reader's "meaning assembly." 90
According to Fish we are either objectivists and assurne that the meaning is in the text, or we are
subjectivists or conventionalists and assume that the rneaning is imposed on the text by the recipient or the
reading conventions of the community. Interaction, Fish complains, evades this clear-cut alternative: "To
the question informing much of contemporary literary theory - what is the source of interpretive authority,
the text or the reader - Iser answers 'both'." 91
Fish attempts to demonstrate the shortcomings of Iser's concept of interaction by demonstrating that
. the distinetion between determinacy and indeterminacy will not hold. Why is this distinction, Fish asks, so
crucial for Iser? It allows hirn, Fish points out, to distinguish what is given and thus restrains the reader's
sense-making activities and it allows him to highlight what the reader supplies to the text. Fish, however,
argues that spots of indeterminacy or gaps "are not built in the text but appear (or do not appear) as a
consequence of particular interpretive strategies." 92 Therefore he concludes that the reader does not
supplement what the text left unsaid but that "he supplies everything." There is no "given":
Perception is never innocent of assumptions, and the assumptions within which it occurs will
be responsible for. the contours of what is perceived. The conclusion is the one I have
reached before: there can be no category of the "given" if by given one means what is there
before interpretation begins;3
89 Cf. Lothar Bredella, "Leseorientierte Literaturtheorie und Literaturunterricht," in Anglistik heute:
Perspektiven für die Lehrerjortbildung, ed. Albert-Reiner Glaap (Frankfurt/Main: Scriptor, 1990),
pp.167 ff.
90 Stanley Fish, "Why No One's Afraid ofWolfgang Iser," in Doing What Comes Naturally (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), p.107.
91 Fish, "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser," p.69.
92 Fish, "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser," p.77.
93 Fish, "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser," p.78.
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If there is no "given" and the reader "supplies everything," one might draw the conclusion that the reader is
free to impose arbitrary interpretations on the text. Yet, Fish forestalls
this conclusion by arguing that the strategies in question are not his [the recipient's] in the
sense that would make hirn an independent agent. Rather, they proceed not from him but
from the interpretive community of which he is a member, they are, in effect, community
property, and insofar as they at once enable and limit the operations of his consciousness,
he is too;4
Thus the community determines the meaning of the text, and in this respect we can conclude that "everything
is given." Fish accepts both cases: We can say "everything is supplied" or "everything is given." But we are not
allowed to say "something is given" or "something is supplied":
Earlier I concluded that the distinction between what is given and what is supplied won't
hold up because everything is supplied, both the determinate and the indeterminate poles
of "the aesthetic object"; now I am arguing that the same distinction won't hold because
everything is given. There is no paradox here. It is just that "supplied" and "given" will only
make sense as fundamental categories of classification if the entities to which they refer are
pure, if, at some level, we can speak meaningfull~ of a text that is simply there, waiting for
areader who is, at least potentially, wholly free. 5
I agree with Fish that perception includes interpretation and that there is no unmediated reality. Whatever
we understand is shaped by our concepts and categories. Yet, if the world were nothing but diffuse material
for our categories, our experience of the world could not question and refute thern. Fish is right when he
says that the distinction between determinacy and indeterminacy is not fIXed but dependent on the interpre-
tive strategy the reader supplies. It is obvious that areader who interprets a literary text within a
psychoanalytic frame of reference will encounter different spots of indeterminacy than areader who
interprets it within a Marxist frame of reference. But in both frames there is a given which demands
understanding. The concept of interpretation without something to interpret is absurd. The alternative
between objectivism and subjectivism does not do justice to what is going on in an interpretation which can
be explained by the model of questions and answers: Our questions partly determine what the answer will
be like, but there is the possibility that answers rnight make us revise our assumptions and expectations so
that we build new ones. As Bernhard Waldenfels points out:
In the interplay between question and answer we not only corne across a given of which
something must be made, but also across a given which challenges us, stimulates us, invites
us, and also intimidates US;6
94 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge/Mass. and London: Harvard University Press,
1980),pp.13-14.
95 Fish, "Why No Gne's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser," p.83.
96 Bernhard Waldenfels, Der Stachel des Frenlden (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), p.64.
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If we playaflute or throw abalI, we not only impose our structure on something diffuse but have to
acknowledge the shape and momentum of the object. Our response to something is neither determined by
the object alone nor is it determined by our strategies alone.97
"The persuasive model" forces Fish to reduce the concept of interpretation to the application of
conventions and interpretive strategies and to dispute that the interpretation is the product of the interaction
between the given and the recipient. But only if we acknowledge this interaction can we understand the
productivity in interpretation which is more than the text alone and the reader alone.
Fish is so much concerned with demonstrating that interpretations are determined by the reading
community alone that he comes to the conclusion that there is nothing uncertain in an interpretation. An
interpretation becomes a closed system which cannot be questioned in a community:
What I have been saying is that there is no subjectivist element of reading because the
observer is never individual in the sense of unique or private, but is always the product of
the categories of understanding that are bis by virtue of bis membersbip in a community
of interpretation;8
Fish does not allow the possibility that the same reading strategies produce different interpretations with
different texts, because the text is mere material for these strategies. He reduces the concept of interpreta-
tion to the demonstration of rules and strategies in the same way a teacher in the foreign language class
room would when asking bis students to produce sentences to demonstrate that they know the rules. But not
all sentences produced by the same rules and conventions have the same meaning.
It is true, there are no facts independent of theories, but having established theories in fields such
as physics or sociology we encounter "facts" wbich force us to modify old theories and to develop new ones.
What is a "fact" in the physicist's frame of reference is not necessarily a "fact" in the sociologist's frame of
reference. But it would be too rash a conclusion to infer from this insight that the physicist and the
sociologist do not encounter "facts't or a "given."
In one of the examples Iser uses to demonstrate the interaction between the literary text and the
reader, he points out that the chapter title "Arcadian Simplicity" in Vanity Fair is "explicitly ironie." Fish
raises the objection that "the irony of 'Arcadian Simplicity' is not explicit in the sense that it announces itself
before interpretation begins; it will be ironie only in the light of an interpretation - a specification of the
author's purpose - already assumed:' 99 Of course, Fish is right, the irony is not given in an absolute sense
but presupposes a complex process of interpretation. But tbis insight does not imply that Iser cannot take
for granted that the readers he has in mind know what a chapter heading is. It is "a given" in bis
interpretation he uses to illuminate what a reader will do who encounters "Arcadian Simplicity" as a heading
in Vanity Fair. If the chapter had another heading, the irony would not come about. Understanding
presupposes a "given." This does not mean that the "given" is absolute and cannot be questioned. It is "given"
in a certain frame of reference.
97 Cf. Bernhard Waldenfels, Ordnung im Zwielicht (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp.44-45.
98 Fish, "Why No Gne's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser," p.83.
99 Fish, "Why No Gne's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser," p.77.
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A consequence of the position Fish develops is that we cannot experience uncertainty because there
is no "given" which invites interpretation. In his book Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics
Robert Jervis also points out that we cannot have "facts" without assumptions and theories:
Pure empiricism is impossible: facts do not speak for themselves. It is not wise -- indeed it is not
possible -- to follow Thomas Huxley's injunction to "sit down before the fact as a mere child,
prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever nature leads, or you will
learn nothing" 100
Yet the conclusions Jervis draws from this insight differ from those Fish draws. For Jervis there is a "given"
which we have to interpret and therefore we have to cope with uncertainties. When for example leading
politicians of another country threaten our own country, should the politicians of our own country take the
threat seriously and immediately start a preventive war or should they interpret the threat as a sign of
weakness which should not be taken too seriously? Gf course, the threat will be interpreted within certain
assumptions and interpretive strategies because the politicians have no immediate access to reality, but this
does not imply that there is no "given" and that there is no uncertainty. If they ignore what is given they
may produce fatal illusions. The breakdown of illusions indicates that there was ci "given" which should have
been taken into consideration.
Fish's position destroys the identity of the text. For him a text exists only in the reader's mind. He
points out that Lycidas has been interpreted in so many different ways that "one of us might be tempted to
complain to the other that we could not possibly be reading the same poem (literary criticism is full of such
complaints), and he would be right, for each of us would be reading the poem he had made." 101 Thus,
according to Fish, the interpretive strategy turns one text into many. But it is also possible, he argues, to read
various texts in such a way that they all become one text. As we have seen, ·the orthodox Marxist aesthetics
reduce all literary texts to class interests. And if we follow Marcuse and Adorno, all literary texts have to
negate' an unjust social order. Fish refers to St. Augustine who urges us to read everything in such a way that
it points to "God's love for us and our answering responsibility to love our fellow creatures for His sake." 102
From this insight Fish draws the conclusion that "the notions of the 'same' or 'different' texts are fictions." 103
Fish's assumption that we as readers alone produce the difference between Lycidas and The Wasteland or
any other text leads to the absurd consequence that we produce what Milton, Eliot or any other author has
written. This makes reading superfluous because we already have in us what Milton and Eliot wrote, so that
we can project it into the text we read. The result of Fish's theoretical position is that we are all are caught
in a solipsistic universe in which interaction with others is impossible. For Fish we cannot describe, we can
only prescribe, we cannot find but only invent. The distinctions between these alternatives may often be
difficult to draw but this does not justify negating them. Fish's reading community is Iris Murdoch's
100 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton/New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1976), p.158.
101 Stanley Fish, "Interpreting the Variornm," in Reader-Response Criticisnl. From Fomlalism to Post





"totalitarian man" who only tolerates and accepts what he has produced. The significance of the text is
reduced to a mere stimulus which only sets the reader in motion but cannot tell him anything.
Fish himself has often shown convincingly how a particular formulation of a text makes the reader
respond in a certain way. It was Fish who attacked the notion of the "Affective Fallacy" and demonstrated
that we have to take the reader's responses into account, because the meaning is not embedded in the text
but produced by the reader responding to it. Let us consider one example which Fish uses to demonstrate
that the meaning is not produced in the interaction but imposed on the text:
He must not tloat upon his wat'ry bier
Unwept... 104
Having read the frrst line, Fish argues, the reader will have formed "an expectation that something will be
done about this unfortunate situation, and [he] the reader anticipates a caU to action, perhaps even a program
for the undertaking of a rescue mission." 105 But then the word "unwept" will disappoint his expectations, and
Fish adds that "the realization of that disappointment will be inseparable from the making of a new (and less
comforting) sense: nothing will be done; Lycidas will continue to float upon bis wat'ry bier ..."106 So far Fish
describes an interaction between the text and the reader. Therefore, he accuses hirnself of having treated the
ending of the line as a "fact of nature" and corrects his interpretation. He argues that his interpretation
presupposes the convention of line endings, so that the line ending is not a "fact," but was produced by the
interpretive strategy he applied: "The truth I think is exactly the reverse: line endings exist by virtue of
perceptual strategies rather than the other way around." 107 But the reader can only apply the convention of
paying special attention to line endings because poets have internalized this convention and produced poems
that can be read this way. Thus the reader encounters a "given." This also implies that an author can break
the conventions and thus force the reader to develop new ones in order to understand the text. These
experiences indicate that an interactive model is more appropriate than Fish's model. While for Adorno art
is "a restorer of historically repressed nature," for Fish it is mere material for demonstrating the power of
the community which imposes its will on the work of art. Adorno can do without the reader and Fish can
do· without the text.
5. Jan Muka~ovski:The Anthropological Significance of Art
With Mukarovsky the emphasis shifts from the question of how a work of art negates or affrrms
reality to the question of how it affects and challenges the recipient. For him the tension between the implicit
outlook of the art work and that of the recipient becomes important:
104 Fish, "Interpreting the Variomm," p.1??
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 F· h "I . h Tf •IS, nterpretlng t e Yanvomm," p.178.
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Only a tension between extra-aesthetic values of a work and the life-values of a collective
enable a work to affect the relation between man and reality, and to affect is the proper
task of art.108
This "tension between the extra-aesthetic values of a work and the life values of a collective" becomes also
important for a critique of JauB's subordination of the aesthetic function to the rhetorica1 one.
In order to understand how art affects OUf attitudes towards reality we must examine the concepts
which MukaFovsky mentioned in the tide of bis significant study Aesthetic Function, Nonn and Va/ue as
Socia/ Facts.
5a) Aesthetic Function as the Dialectical Negation of Practical Functions
What is characteristic of the aesthetic function and how does it relate to other functions? The
aesthetic function is not limited to art, it also plays an important role in other aspects of human life. It is not
an attribute that adheres to certain things, but is dependent on the recipient's attitudes. This means: "any
activity, whether natural or human, may become a vehicle of the aesthetic function." 109 If we look at an
object aesthetically, we do not use it to achieve other goals. We turn our attention to it for its own sake.
Thus the aesthetic function is based on the negation of practical functions. Kant called this attitude
Itdisinterested pleasure.1t "Disinterested" does not mean indifference, but on the contrary, expresses the fact
that we do not subordinate things under our practical, moral, or intellectual interests but appreciate them
for their own sake.
In practical realms, such as clothing, living, eating, religion and science, etc. the aesthetic function
accompanies other functions and can strengthen them. It can serve to represent power and prestige. It can
also be used to replace other functions which have lost their significance. Thus the Christmas tree, which has
lost its religious function, can gain an aesthetic function. A scientific work, which may have once fulfilled
an intellectual function, can later be read for its aesthetic function. Here we might also refer to the Bible
which many people nowadays read aesthetically. These examples of practica1 realms must suffice at this point.
Let us now turn to the realm of art. While the aesthetic function accompanies practical functions outside of
art, it is dominant within the work of art. What does the dominance of the aesthetic function in an art work
mean?
Mukatovskj takes .up the traditional concept of aesthetics - "the aesthetic function ... will make the
object itself a purpose, whenever and wherever it manifests itself" 110 - and transcends it when he calls the
aesthetic function the dialectical negation of the practical functions. What is meant by this characterization?
In his essay "Poetic Designation and the Aesthetic Functionof Language" MukaYovsky refers to the
three linguistic functions as Bühler described them in his language model: the representational, the expressive
and the appellative function. He calls these three functions the practical ones and confronts them with a
108 Jan Mukarovsky,Aesthetic FUllction, Nonn alld Va/lle as Socia/ Facts. Translated by Mark E. Suino (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979), p.93.
109 Mukarovsky, Aesthetic Function, p.1.
110 Jan Mukarovsky, Kunst, Poetik, Selniotik. Translated by Erika and Walter Annuß (Frankfurt/Main:
Suhrkamp, 1989), p.118.
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fourth one: the aesthetic function. Yet, the aesthetic function has no content of its OWD. Its content instead
results from the process of negation of the practiCal functions.
Muka10vskY illustrates what it means when the representational function is dialectically negated with
the phrase "dusk is approaching." 111 MukafovsIcY wants to demonstrate that the aesthetic quality of this
phrase does not lie in the language itself but in the way we perceive it. For this purpose the utterance is ill
chosen, because "dusk is approaching" has a certain aesthetic quality in itself. But let us pursue how
Mukalovsky distinguishes between the aesthetic and the practical function.
When we hear the phrase "dusk is approaching" as apart of a message in a pragmatic situation,
Muka10vsky argues, we focus our attention"on the relation between the designation and the reality signified."112
Thus the question may arise whether it is really getting dark or whether the speaker is merely trying to
deceive the listener. Whichever question will be asked depends on the meaning this message gains for each
respective context in everyday life.
According to Mukatovsk1 we react differently when we read this phrase within a literary work. Then
we will not ask if it is really getting dark, but instead consider the phrase within its context and explore its
relation to other elements of the work. When the representational function is negated, we focus our attention
on the statement per se and its context. In the essay "Dichterisches Wort und Wirklichkeit" Mukafovsq
examines the phrase "spring is coming" in a number of poems in order to illustrate a wide range of different
meanings this phrase takes on in the particular contexts in which it is used.113 Thus we can summarize: The
negation of the representational function of language implies that we do not ask whether events which are
presented are true. In the same way the negation of the expressive function implies that we do not ask
whether the poet has really experienced the feelings and thoughts he represents.
Yet, if the negation of the practical functions of language directs our attention to the internal
relations between utterances one could ask whether MukaIovsky does not confrrm the traditional view of
aesthetics which asserts that the art work has no connection with reality. Mukalovsky himself responds to
this question:
.If the answer to this question were affirmative, art would be reduced to agame, the sole
purpose of which would be aesthetic pleasure. Such a conclusion would, however, be
obviously incomplete.114
The negation or weakening of the relation between the sign and the particular reality it refers to is only the
presupposition that the art work refers to reality as a whole. Thus a portrait, if it is received aesthetically,
does not inform us about a particular individual but expresses a certain attitude toward reality as a whole.
It is not a document referring to a certain person who lived in a certain place at a certain time but directs
our attention to "a unifying attitude toward reality":
111 In Jan Muka10vskY: The Word and Verbal Art. Selected Essays by lan Mukarovsky. Translated and edited
by John Burbank and Peter Steiner (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p.65.
112 Mukafovsky, The Word and Verbal Art, p.66.
113 Cf. Mukalovsky, Kunst, Poetik, Senliotik, pp.269-270.
114 Mukafovsky, The Word and Verbal Art, p.71.
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No matter how minute is the segment of reality which it represents, and even when it does
not represent anything at all - as a musical work, for example - the work of art as an
aesthetic sign has the cafacity to refer to reality as a whole and to express and evoke man's
relation to the universe. 15
When we read Dostojevsky's novel Crinte and Punishment, MukJovsky' argues, we are not informed about
a particular reality, events that happened a long time ago in a foreign culture, but perceive in it a certain
attitude toward reality which concerns us:
It is highly probable that the majority of those who have read or will read this novel have
never committed or will never commit murder. It is equally certain that no crime today
could be committed in a social or ideological situation identical to the one which gave birth
to Raskolnikov's crime. Nevertheless, those who read Dostojevsky's novel react to their
reading with the most intimate of their experiences: every reader feels that sua res agitur.116
We shall take up this example again when we discuss the aesthetic value. Here it serves to highlight what is
crucial for MukafovskY's aesthetics, namely that the weakening of the practical functions of language
strengthens the interaction between the art work and the recipient's experience of reality, so that the recipient
responds with his or her total set of values to the art work:
The weakening of the immediate relation of poetic designation to reality is counterbalanced
by the fact that a poetic work as a global designation enters into relation with the total set
of the existential experiences of the subject, be he the creative or the perceiving subject.117
For MukaJovsq the autonomy of art directs our attention from "the relation between designation and the
reality signified" to the relation between the art work as "a global designation" and "the total set of the
existential experiences of the subject":
... the autonomy of the art work and the dominance of the aesthetic function and value
within it appear not as destroyers of all contact between the work and reality - natural and
social - but as constant stimuli of such contact.116
Thus works of art acquire the capacity to refer to a reality which is different from the one in which they
were produced and can refer to a set ofvalues and experiences other than the one from which they arose.119
So far 1 have shown how the negation or weakening of the practical functions of language makes it
possible that the art work refers not only to a particular reality but to reality as a whole and to the recipient's
total set of values, but the situation is more complex. The art work has two semiotic functions, an
autonomous and a communicative one. As a communicative sign art refers to a particular reality.
115 Jan Mukalovskj, Strncture, Sign and Function. Selected Essays. Translated and edited by John Burbank
and Peter Steiner (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), p.21.
116 uk ~ .. .,M arovsky, The Word and Verbal Art, p.71.
117 Mukaf'ovskj, Tlte Word and Verbal Art, p.73.
118 MukaYovsky, Aesthetic Function, p. 90.
119 Cf. Jan Mukai'ovskY:Kapitel aus der ri"sthetik. Translated by Walter Schamschula (Frankfurt/Main:
Suhrkamp, 1970), p.78.
28
Thus a literary work functions not only as a work of art but also and simultaneously as
parole, expressing astate of mind, a thought, an emotion, and so forth.120
Yet, even as a communicative sign an art work does not raise the claim that the thing signified exists,
although it is not unimportant for the structure of the art work whether "it treats its subject as 'real'
(sometimes even as documentary) or 'fictive; or whether it oscillates between these two poles." 121 The
situation is further complicated by the fact that the dialectically negated practical functions do not simply
disappear but are present in the art work:
... consequently, every poetic work is - at least virtually - simultaneously a presentation, an .
expression, and an appeal. Often it is precisely these practical functions which manifest
themselves to a considerable degree in a work of art: for example, the presentational .
function in the novel, the expressive function in lyric poetry.122
Thus tensions between the practical functions and the aesthetic function can arise. For example the negation
of the expressive function makes us receive a poem in such a way that we do not take the represented
thoughts and feelings of the "lyrical I" as those of the author, but there are poets who want us to take the
represented feelings and thoughts as their OWD. For MukaYovs}{fsuch tensions between the aesthetic function
and the dialectically negated functions increase our interaction with the art work:
From the standpoint of art, a strong polar tension is optimal between functional multitude
and functional singularity, or, in other words, between the dominance of the aesthetic
function and that of the extra-aesthetic functions, which most intensely become valid in the
work of art.123
This insight into the tensions between the practical and the aesthetic functions allows us to correct JauB's
concept of the aesthetic experience which reduces art to the practical or the rhetorical function. For Jauß,
Brecht faced the dilemma "how norms of action could be suggested to him [the solitary spectator] without
their being overtly or covertly imposed." Yet, in order to explain the effect of Brecht's plays we have to
consider the tension between the rhetorical and the aesthetic function. And this makes it possible to say that
the rhetorical function in Brecht's plays heightens the aesthetic function and vice versa.
In her book On the Margins 0/ Discourse. The Relation 0/ Literature and Language Barbara
Herrnstein Smith develops a concept of art which comes close to MukaYovslo/s aesthetics. She introduces
the distinction between "natural" and "fictive" utterances. She defmes the "natural utterance" in the following
way:
By'natural discourse' I mean here all utterances - trivial or sublime, ill-wrought or eloquent,
true or false, scientific or passionate - that can be taken as someone's saying something,
120 Mukafovsk~ Stnlcture, Sign and FUllction, p.85.
121 Muka10vskY; Strnctllre, Sign Qnd Function, p.86.
122 Mukafovsky, 17ze Word and Verbal Art, p.69.
123 Mukarovsky, Kunst, Poetik, Sel1ziotik, p.79.
Cf. also Jan Mukarovsk)'; Schriften zur Ästhetik, Kunsttheorie und Poetik. Translated by Holger Siegel
(Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1986), pp.9-11.
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somewhere, sometime, that is, as the verbal acts of real persons on particular occasions in
response to particular sets of circumstances. In stressing all these particularities, I wish to
emphasize that a natural utterance is a historica1 event: like any other event, it occupies a
specific and unique point in time and space.124
In contrast to the natural utterance the fictive utterance has no place in space and time. It is not "historically
determinate." This has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of fictive discourse. In order to
understand a natural utterance, Smith argues, we have to reconstruct its historical context. Thus the historical
context is more than a kind of physical setting in which the utterance occurs but a complex set of forces
which "occasions" the utterance. When we, however, want to understand a fictive utterance, we cannot
reconstruct the historical context but have to invent a context in which the utterance could have been plausibly
uttered. In order to do that we, as readers, have to activate our knowledge about language and human
behavior. Thus the literary work as fictive discourse weakens the relationship between designation and the
reality signified and strengthens the relation between the art work and the recipient's total set of experiences.
When we attempt to invent a context for the utterance we will make inferences, supplement what
has been left unsaid and make conjectures ,which will be modified or replaced by more adequate ones. This
process in which our cognitive faculties are activated and in which we can make new discoveries about
ourselves is what we, as Smith points out, call interpretation:
And what we mean when we speak of interpreting a poem is, in large measure, precisely
this process of inference, conjecture, and indeed creation of contexts. But these contexts -
"meanings" - that we half create and half perceive, can be no more than "plausible," for the
poem is a fictive utterance and its' context can be neither discovered nor verified in nature
or history.125
There are biographers and literary historians whoclaim that we should not invent the context for the fictive
utterance but reconstruct the author's life and time and make sense of the fictive utterance in this context.
Thus they change the fictive utterance into a natural one. Smith regards such an approach with suspicion:
The interpretation of a poem as a historical utterance may serve the special purposes of the
literary historian or biographer, but it is likely to appear shallow, reductive, or "literal-
minded" precisely to the degree that it restricts the context of the poem to historical particu-
lars and suggests that the meanings of the poem are to be located exclusively in a
historically determinate context.126
Smith stresses in the same way asMukafovsky that literary texts do not inform us ahout a particular section
of reality hut appeal to the reader's total set of experiences and values. Smith constructs the following
example in order to demonstrate what it means to read a poem as a "fictive" and as a "natural" utterance:
124 Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins 0/Discourse. The Relation 0/Literature to Language (Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.15.
125 Smith, On the Margins 0/ Discourse, .p. 33.
126 Smith, On the Margins 0/ Discourse, pp. 34-35.
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A close friend teIls us that he has just composed a poem, and asks us to read it; in the
"poem" we discover what appears to be an allusion to his poor health or domestic
troubles.127 .
How are we supposed to read the "poem"? Should we read it as an art work and thus negate the allusions
to our friend's personal griefs and problems? Or is such a reading insensitive to the expressive function of
language? Did our friend only use the form of a poem to inform us about bis personal troubles? But if we
take his "poem" only as a disguise for a natural utterance and attempt to comfort him, he might accuse us
of violating his privacy and of being unable to understand a poem as a work of art.128
As a poet the author does not express his griefs and troubles but - to use another term by Smith -
represents griefs and troubles. This also implies that the author is no longer personally responsible for what
the lyrical "I" says and he can express and explore thoughts and feelings which he would not dare to express
as personal utterances. Thus literary works allow us to extend the realm of what can be expressed and
explored.129 In spite of the similarities between Smith and Muka'fovskY: the concept of the aesthetic function
as the dialectical negation of the practical functions is more flexible than the concept of "fictive discourse."
While for Smith there is only the alternative between natural and fictive discourse, MukaYovsky allows us to
acknowledge the tension between them.
Both Smith and MukaTovsky emphasize that literary works fulfill their function in initiating a
complex· process of reception in which the reader can respond more freely than in everyday life. Smith
assumes that we as human beings have probably "survived because of our epistemic hunger and irritability,
our itch to know and our capacity to learn" and that we therefore take pleasure in cognitive activities.130 Yet,
in everyday life the display of our cognitive activities is "not always rewarded with discoveries and revelations"
since the natural utterances, we have to understand, "are often obscure and fragmentary, or predictable and
monotonous." 131
Smith takes up an idea by Nelson Goodman who argues in Languages 0/Art that there is an affmity
between science and art and directs our attention to the similarities between the cognitive activities of the
scientist and the artist. Smith agrees with bis description, yet also stresses that there is a distinction between
the exploration of nature and society on the one hand and an art work on the other. Nature and society are
not created to be explored by the scientist but the art work is created "precisely to encourage and reward
such exploration":
My point here is that we - that is, human beings, but perhaps not uniquely among organisms
- do indeed take pleasure in what Goodman calls cognitive activity, and that this pleasure
or satisfaction may be diminished or enhanced byvarious circumstances, and that the artist
is one who is skilIed at. fashioning such enhancing circumstances, and that we call
circumstances so fashioned works 0/ art.132
127 Smith, On the Margins 0/ Discourse, p.112.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
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This anthropological interpretation of art is the opposite of Adorno's theory. Here the recipient need not
"vanish in the work of art" but instead the work of art allows him to take pleasure in the display of his or her
cognitive faculties. Works of art gain their significance by the complex process of the reception they initiate.
Yet, while Smith emphasizes the recipient's cognitive activities, Mukarovsky stresses the recipient's values
which are activated by the art work. These two aspects, however, do not exclude but supplement each other.
The emphasis on the recipient's values prevents the reception of an art work from becoming mere play.
Smith as well as MukalovskY put the emphasis not on historicalor psychological but on
hermeneutical understanding. In this respect they would agree with Hans-Georg Gadamer who says that it
would be an inadmissable abstraction to contend that we must first have achieved a
contemporaneousness with the author or the original reader by means of a reconstruction
of his historical horizon before we could begin to grasp the meaning of what is said.133
For Gadamer, historical and psychological understanding prevent us from being challenged by the art work
and putting our concepts and values at risk. We bridge the gap between the past and the present by
bracketing our concepts and values and transposing ourselves "into the spirit of the age, think with its ideas
and its thoughts, not with our own ... ,,134 But for Gadamer, "of all things that confront us in nature and
history, it is the work of art that speaks to us most directly" 135 and thus demands from us to think with our
own ideas. This is the presupposition for having them challenged:
The intimacy with which the work of art touches us is at the same, in enigmatic fashion, a
shattering and demolition of the familiar.136
Thus the weakening of the connection between the art work and its historical context does not imply that
there is "no task of understanding." 137 On the contrary, tbis weakening is the presupposition of the intense
interaction between the art work and the recipient. In order to pursue this interaction in more detail, let us
now turn to MukaYovskys second term:
Sb) Aesthetic Norm
The terms aesthetic function, norm, and value are interdependent. Mukalovsk{himself points out:
The concept of norm is inseparable from the concept of function, the realization of which
the norm implements. Because such a realization· presupposes an activity tending toward
a specific goal, we must admit that the limitation by which this activity is organized has in
itself the character of energy as well.138
133 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Phi/osophica/ Henneneutics. Translated and edited by David E. Linge (Berkely,
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1976), p.101.
134 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Tnlth and Method. Second, Revised Edition. Translation revised by Joel
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (NewYork: Crossroads, 1990), p.297.
135 Gadamer, Phi/osophica/ Henneneutics, p.95.
136 Gadamer, Phi/osophica/ Henneneutics, p.104.
137 Gadamer, Phi/osophica/ Henneneutics, p.96.
138 Mukafovsk~ Stnlcture,Sign and Function, p.49.
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Thus the norm can be regarded as "a regulating energetic principle." Yet the individual who applies the norm
will experience it "as a limitation on the freedom of his action." But on the other hand a norm also opens
up the possibility to decide "whether to subordinate his judgment to the constraints of this pressure" and in
this process the norm will not remain constant but will be subject to change.
Because of this dynamic nature, a norm is subjected to continuous changes. We can even
consider that every concrete application of a norm is at the same time necessarily a change
in norm.139
What we said so far is valid for a11 norms, legal, moral or aesthetic. What is characteristic of the aesthetic
norm?
First of all, we should recall that the aesthetic norm is in opposition to these others because
it does not tend toward a practical goal but rather aims at the object itself which is its
vehicle so that this object becomes the only immediate goal of the activity.140
If aesthetic appreciation is based on the particular and unique shape of an art work, the aesthetic norm
seems to be problematic. Does the uniqueness of the art work preclude the application of a norm?
Mukalovskyargues that the uniqueness of an art work is not absolute and that its uniqueness can only be
experienced by the violation of aesthetic norms. While there are "rules of taste" whose violation will be
punished,.in autonomous art the aesthetic norm, as Mukarovsky points out, "tends to be violated rather than
to be observed." Thus he comes to the conclusion: "It [the aesthetic norm] has less than any other norm the
character of an inviolable law."141 This also makes MukaYovsky wonder whether one should not give up the
concept of the aesthetic norm. But he argues that the aesthetic norm fulfi11s an indispensable function in art.
Norms force art to transcend them and to develop new ones in order to renewart. At the same time
Mukarovsky is convinced that aesthetic norms have constant features, "common to a11 human beings
regardless of differences of time, place, and social position." 142 Yet, when Mukal'ovsky stresses basic
aesthetic norms we should not forget that the fulHllment of a norm does not determine the quality of an art
work:
All these "anthropologically" motivated postulates, which we have mentioned as examples,
have not only been frequently violated in art, but their perfect realization makes the ar0 usa!
of aesthetic pleasure impossible. The absolute regular rhythm of running machines puts us
to sleep, the perfect symmetry of an isoceles triangle is aesthetica11y indifferent.143
If the aesthetic norm does not determine the quality of an art work, another concept is needed: one which
is able to do justice to the art work "as a unique fact." 144
139 MukaFovskY; Stmcture, Sign and Fllnction, p. 50.
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Sc) The Aesthetic Value
In "Problems of Aesthetic Value" Muka10vsky defmes "function" and "value" in the following way:
"By function we understand an active relation between an object and the goal for which it is used. The value
then is the utility of the object for such a goal." 145 What must the aesthetic value of an art work be like in
order to be useful for fulfl1ling the function of art?
For JauB, the weakness of Mukarovskfs position lies in the fact that he introduces the aesthetic
value "as an objective third element." 146 Muk~ovskfalso speaks of an independent or universal aesthetic
value. In order to understand the objective, independent, or universal aesthetic value it is important to
distinguish it from the actual process of evaluation. Just like JauB, Mukafovskjis convinced there is no such
thing as an objective aesthetic evaluation. This is not only supported by the fact that we evaluate works of
art differently, but also by the fact that our evaluations of the same artifact are based on different aesthetic
objects which we produce in the interaction with the artifact:
In the course of time a materiaUy identical work can become several aesthetic objects
radically different from one another, each corresponding to a different stage in the
development of the given art.147
In order to distinguish between the aesthetic object we produce while reading the literary text and the
evaluation of what we have produced, Louise M. Rosenblatt uses the terms "evocation" and "response." As
she points out, we do not respond to the artifact but to the work of art we are evoking during the process
of reception. "In our transaction with Dickens's text, Great Expectations, for example, we evoke the characters
of Pip and Joe. We participate in their relationship and, at the same time, we respond with approval or
disapproval to their words and actions." 148
Our evaluations are variable because they are not based on the material art work, be it words,
colors, lines or tones, but on their synthesis which the recipient accomplishes. Thus evaluations are always
subjective. But behind these evaluations must be an energy which makes recipients from different periods
and cultures respond to the art work:
And it is precisely here that we fmd the universai value of the work of art furnished by its
formal capacity to function as an aesthetically valuable object in very different social milieux,
though value itself is qualitatively different in these various environments.149
MukaYovsky, conceiving the aesthetic value as energy which makes the recipient evaluate, can acknowledge
the changeablity of the aesthetic value. Thus he can do justice to the historical development without ending
145 In Muka1ovsk~Stnlcture, Sign and Function, p.XXlI.
146 JauB, Aesthetic Experience, p.116.
147. Mukafovsky, Stnlcture, Sign and Function, p.62.
148 Louise M. Rosenblatt, "The Transactional Theory of Literary Work: Implications for Research," in
Researching Response to Literature and the Teaching 0/ Literature, ed. Charles R. Cooper (Norwoodj
New Jersey, 1983), p.38.
149 MukaYovsky, Stnlctllre, Sign and FUllctioll, p.66.
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in relativism. The aesthetic value points to the capacity of the art work to activate the reader's most
subliminal experiences and values.
After all, universal aesthetic value is not exhausted by the aesthetic effectiveness of the work
alone. The work that is its vehicle will also have the capacity to reach the deepest layers and
the most various aspects of the mentallife of a person who enters into contact with it.150
When we discussed the aesthetic function we stressed that it weakens the connection between the art work
and the particular reality it refers to and intensifies the relationship between the art work and reality as a
whole. Thus the reader of Crime and Punishment, as we pointed out, is not informed about a particular
reality in Russia in the 19th century but gets the impression that the things presented concern him. Now we
can add that the aesthetic value of the novel is the greater the more.it can activate the reader so that he feels
a strong relationship
to the reality which [he] the reader himself is familiar with, to situations which he has
experienced, or, given the circumstances in which he lives, he might experience, to feelings
and unrestrained emotions which might - or actually did - accompany the situations, to
actions on the part of the reader which might have been caused by the situations.151
In contrast to Adorno's aesthetics, for Mukal'ovsk1 art should not negate the world and make the self
disappear in the reconciliation between subject and object but should "reach the deepest layers and the most
various aspects of mental life of aperson." This aesthetic value refers to the recipient who creates the
aesthetic object in the interaction with the artifact and is changed by this process.
Mukarovsky1s concept of the aesthetic value overcomes the opposition be~een form and content
because both are judged by their contributions to the aesthetic value:
An ethical or social value can be for example one way of presenting the relationships people
have among one another and deciding about their importance in an epic work (cf. the
famous difference between the good knight and the evil one.) 152
Here, good and evil are formal elements which contribute to a complex whole. But all the formal elements
of a literary work also embody extra-aesthetic values so that one can regard the art work "as an actual
collection of extra-aesthetic values":
If we ask ourselves at this point what has happened to aesthetic value, it appears that it has
dissolved into individual extra-aesthetic values, and is really nothing but a general term for
the dynamic totality of their mutual relationships.153
150 Ibid.
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If the art work is "an actual collection of extra-aesthetic values" we must not forget that they are often
arranged in an unfamiliar way so that they take on a different meaning from the one they have in everyday
life:
The influence of the aesthetic value is not that it swallows up and represses all remaining
values, but that it releases every one of them from direct contact with a corresponding life-
value. It brings an entire assembly of values contained in the work as a dynamic whoIe into
contact with a total system of those values which form the motive power of the life practice
of the perceiving collective.154
The aesthetic value breaks up the routine relationship among values and thus activates the recipient to create
a ·new dynamic whole:
We can therefore say that the degree of independent value of an artistic artifact will be
greater to the degree that the bundle of extra-aesthetic values which it attracts is greate~
and to the degree that it is able to intensify the dynamism of their mutual connections.15
Thus the aesthetic value makes comprehensible how the function of art to renew "the ties between man and
reality as the realm of human action" 156 can be fulfilled.
Conclusion
The differences between art as affrrmation and negation and art as interaction have far-reaching
consequences for our understanding of the significance of literature in everyday life and in the classroom.
But before I highlight this difference it is interesting to note that Stanley Fish asserts that his theory has no
practical consequences.
That is, it does· not follow from what I have been saying that you should go out and do
literary criticism in a certain way or refrain from doing it in other ways. The reason for this
is that the position I have been presenting is not one that you (or anyone else) could live
by.157
Fish is right: No one can live by his theory which destroys practice as he himself admits:
With respect to what I have been saying, those consequences include the absence of any
standard by which one could determine error, the impossibility of preferring one
interpretation to another, an inability to explain the mechanisms by which interpretations
are accepted and rejected, or the source of the feeling we all have of progressing and so
on.158
Therefore it is no surprise if Fish recommends that we ignore bis theory and instead go on as before:
154 Muk~ovskY: Aesthetic Function, p.89.
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... the general or metacritical belief (to which I am trying to persuade you in these lectures)
d.oes not in any way affect the belief or set of beliefs (about the nature of literature, the
proper mode of critical inquiry, the forms of literary evidence, and so on) which~elds the
interpretation that now seems to you (or to me) to be inescapable and obvious. 9
Theoretically we ttknowtt that interpretations are unfounded and that our attempts to give evidence are self-
deceptions because there is no "given," but this should not disturb us as long as we are conditioned by our
reading community to fmd our interpretations "inescapable and obvious." Thus the "radical theory" does not
interfere and leaves everything as it is. Fish, however, remarks that bis "persuasive model" has a consequence
in so far as it conveys "a greatly enhanced sense of the importance of our activities": "No longer is the critic
the humble servant of texts whose glories exist independently of anytbing he might do." 160 But if for the
objectivist the glories of the text exist independently of the critic, for Fish the critic's glories exist indepently
of the text. But even more problematic is that the "greatly enhanced sense of importance" can only be
experienced "in theory," in "practice" the critic is subject to the conventions of the reading community he
cannot help but apply.
While for Fish theory does not interfere with practice, for Adorno theory should negate practice.
The only form of practice is the refusal of practice, but even this form of practice becomes affIrmative and
ideological because it is unable to intervene" and leaves the world "untouched." For Adorno the promise of
the comprehensive philosophy of history has failed and this failure is not only due to exterior but also to in-
herent causes. Reason itself is a form of violence and does not tolerate what is non-identical and particular.
Yet Adorno's criticism of reason and enlightenment remains as· general and totalizing as the criticized
system. Although he negates the comprehensive philosophy of history, he remains bound to it. Yetart as
interaction reveals a different kind of reason or rationality. In our criticism of Fish's subjectivism or
conventionalism we have pointed out that the work of art is not merely material for the recipient to structure
and order, but that it speaks to the recipient who responds to it. The relationship between question and
answer points to "a responsive rationality" 161 which can break up what tends to become a vicious circle
between negation and affIrmation.
Yet an approach which directs our attention to the development and change of limited orders might
be accused of losing sight of the fact that the world is "a place of disaster triumphant" and that the holocaust
demonstrates the failure of civilization. But if we assume that the dialectic of enlightenment describes human
history adequately, then there cannot be any change. Adorno himself admits that the historical inevitablity
of the dialectic of enlightenment makes it appear ontological. It is indeed a kind of miracle that it is at all
possible for Adorno in this world which is totally dominated by false consciousness to become aware of it
as false and to unmask what appears to be ontological as historical.162 In order to break up the circle of
negation and affrrmation we would have to acknowledge the recipient and the difference between the
aesthetic and the practical functions. As long as art is subject to the objective dialectic of negation and
159 Fish,Is 17,ere a Text in this Class?, p.357.
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affirmation, we fIrst overestimate art and then accuse it of being too weak to bring about the change it has
promised.
When Mukafovsky"defines the aesthetic function as the dialectical negation of the practical functions
he does not expect the aesthetic function "to intervene." The negation only liberates the reader from the
practical functions and thus creates the presupposition for the recipient to respond more freely to the work
of art without being afraid of sanctions: Art claims not to change reality but the recipient's attitude towards
it. There is, of course, always the possibility, as we have seen with Marcuse in "The AffIrmative Character
of Culture" and with St. Augustine and Rousseau that the aesthetic experience makes the recipient forget
reality so that he or she enjoys the work of art for its own sake. Yet at the same time the aesthetic distance
makes the recipient expose himself or herself to experiences which he or she would otherwise shun. For
MukaYovsky such an exposure which is brought about by the aesthetic function is necessary because the
practical function
if left alone impoverishes, makes one-sided, and inordinately simplifies man's relation to
reality ... If man has to do battle with reality again and again he nlust keep a~proaching it
from new directions, keep discovering unexploited aspects and possibilities.'
Such an effect of art, however, does not give instructions of how to change the world. It does not simplify
but instead complicates our perceptions of the world. Therefore the objection to the aesthetic experience that
it is affIrmative can easily be raised, but such an objection often overlooks that the complex process of
reception sharpens our sensibility and thus has a mediated effect on reality. MukaYovsky can accept such a
mediated effect because for him reality is not only the realm of necessity and a pIace of disaster which has
to be negated, but also the realm in which we act with others according to certain rules and values. Yet this
order which is based on selection and seclusion tends to make itself absolute. Therefore, art is needed to give
shape to what is suppressed and to open up new perspectives. Thus art fulfills a critical function: the present
order needs to be questioned and challenged but the new order will also be a limited one which needs to be
transcended. Art cannot create the world in which it will no longer be necessary. It can only counteract the
simplifications and suppressions of the existing order. Thisanthropological function of art demands an
attentive recipient who creates the aesthetic object by responding to the artefact and his or her own
experiences and values. Thus MukaTovsk)' not only asks us, as teachers of literature, to illuminate the
interaction between the art work and the recipient but also to encourage it.
163 Mukafovsky, Stmcture, Sign and FUllction, p.22.
